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INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 1993, the United States Senate voted overwhelmingly to confirm President Clinton's nomination of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court.1 In contrast to the confirmation hearings of some recent nominees to the Court, the
Senate Judiciary Committee's questioning of Justice Ginsburg
was marked by polite inquiry rather than by efforts to derail
the nomination.2 Freed from the specter of an aggressive exam-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D. and

BA, Boston University. The author wishes to disclose that he served as a
member of the Supreme Court Nomination Task Force advising Senator Herb

Kohl (D - Wis.) on the Ginsburg nomination, and that he was formerly an
Associate at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson in Washington, D.C.
where Justice Ginsburg's spouse is Of Counsel.
1 See Senate Confirms Ginsburg by a 96-to-3 Vote, NEW YORK TIMES, Au-

gust 4, 1993 at Al.
2 See Holly Idelson, Ginsburg Marches Past Hearings On Near-CertainPath
to Court, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, July 24, 1993, at 1956.
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ination of her judicial philosophy, Justice Ginsburg answered
the Committee's questions cautiously and, at times, evasively.
One consequence of the Senate Judiciary Committee's restraint
during the confirmation hearings is that Justice Ginsburg will
join the Supreme Court without having given a clear indication
of her legal views on a number of subject areas. In particular,
Justice Ginsburg revealed little about her views on legal issues
that concern the business community.
For suggestions as to how Justice Ginsburg might rule on
business-related cases, one must turn to her prior judicial record. Indeed, during the hearings, Justice Ginsburg stated that
her prior judicial opinions and academic writings were "the
most tangible, reliable indicator of [her] attitude, outlook, approach and style."4 Admittedly, it is often perilous to speculate
on the future voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices based
on their previous legal opinions, experience, and party affiliation.5 However, an examination of Justice Ginsburg's record
does provide some insights into her likely approach to businesslaw issues.
This article argues that Justice Ginsburg's rulings during her
years on the D.C. Circuit suggest that while on the Supreme
Court she will take a "moderate" to "conservative" approach to
issues that concern corporate America, despite the fact that she
may hold more liberal views on many social issues. Justice
Ginsburg's opinions dealing with antitrust, securities, and regulatory issues during her tenure on the D.C. Circuit reveal that
she has often adhered to certain basic "conservative" legal
principles. However, as the following discussion illustrates,

3 See id.

"Hearings on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary,U.S.
Senate (July 20, 1993) [hereinafter Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination]
(opening statement of Judge Ginsburg) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,

Fednew file.
' Chief Justice Earl Warren, for example, turned out to be far more liberal
than his prior political record would have suggested or than the President who
appointed him - Dwight Eisenhower - would have hoped; Justice David
Souter, in his brief stint on the Court, also has been significantly more liberal

than might have been expected. See generally Fox Butterfield, Growing as a
Justice, Unchanged as a Man, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, July 6, 1992, at
2; Nancy E. Roman, Friendly Ideology Often Vanishes With High Court Seat,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 5, 1992, at Al.
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Justice Ginsburg is not doctrinaire, nor is she a conservative
ideologue on business matters. On the contrary, she has shown
herself to be a pragmatic jurist who occasionally adopts more
"liberal" legal principles in business cases if such a position is
warranted by the particular facts.

I.

BAsic LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Examination of Justice Ginsburg's opinions on business and
regulatory issues indicates that three bedrock legal principles
consistently inform her decisions of these issues. These
principles are that: 1) expansive application of regulatory restrictions on corporate conduct should generally be avoided; 2)
respect should be shown to business activity that is designed to
increase economic efficiency; and 3) deference generally should
be shown to the decisions of administrative agencies acting
within their sphere of authority. All three of these principles
are typically associated with a "conservative" judicial philosophy. However, Justice Ginsburg has not applied these principles
in every case. She has been willing to make exceptions when
applying these precepts would conflict with other fundamental
(typically constitutional) principles of particular importance to
her (protection of free speech and access to the federal courts
for example). For this reason, it is appropriate to characterize
Justice Ginsburg as "moderate to conservative" - rather than
purely "conservative" - on business and regulatory issues.
A.

Avoiding Expansive Application of Regulatory Restrictions
on Corporate Activity

In several cases, Justice Ginsburg has declined to apply
regulatory restrictions on business activity expansively. Instead,
where she did not find clear indications that Congress intended
a broad application of the statute at issue, Justice Ginsburg
tended to adopt a relatively narrow interpretation. Under this
approach, less corporate conduct falls under statutory or regulatory restrictions than critics of that conduct or than government
regulatory agencies would generally, prefer.
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For example, in Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,6 Justice (then D.C. Circuit Judge) Ginsburg interpreted
the scope of the federal proxy rules in a manner that allows
publicly held corporations to omit certain types of shareholder
proposals from their proxy materials. The case was brought by
a Du Pont shareholder who wished to have the company place
two proposals - only one of which warrants discussion here on the ballot at the next shareholder meeting. Although Du
Pont had publicly announced its intention to stop manufacturing chlorofluorocarbons -within a few years, the plaintiff had
sought a shareholder vote on a proposal that would have required an earlier phase out than management preferred.' The
company, in response, refused to place the shareholder's proposal on the ballot, claiming it was entitled to rebuff the shareholder under a Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
proxy rule that allowed it to exclude proposals dealing with
"the conduct of... ordinary business operations."'
Justice Ginsburg's opinion first held that the plaintiff had an
implied private right of action to sue in federal court for a
violation of this proxy rule; this right had been assumed for
years but no court before had ever actually held it to exist.'
Justice Ginsburg then rejected the plaintiffs claims, affirming
the district court. Justice Ginsburg did not address the broader
question of whether the company's decision to produce or not to
produce chlorofluorocarbons is one relating to the conduct of
ordinary business operations. ° Had that been the issue, she
may well have held that a shareholder proposal raising it went
beyond ordinary business operations, and that management,
therefore, could not exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8.
Instead, Justice Ginsburg held that the question of whether the
company should cease chlorofluorocarbon production immediately, or in one year's time as management wanted - a mere
timing question - is a matter of ordinary business operations
that management need not submit to a shareholder vote."

6 958 F.2d 416
7 Id. at 425.

(D.C. Cir. 1992).

' Securities and Exchange Commission
§ 240.14a-8(c)(7). See 958 F.2d at 417.
9 958 F.2d at 425.
10

Rule

14a-8(c)(7),

See id.

n Id. at 428.
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Justice Ginsburg adopted this interpretation of the Rule 14a8 exclusion even though the SEC, the agency that promulgated
the federal proxy rules, had taken the position that the exclusion should be read narrowly and should require a corporation
to include a proposal such as this one in its mailings to shareholders.'2 The SEC argued that the timing of corporate conduct fell within the ordinary business operations exclusion under Rule 14a-8 only if the conduct itself fell within that exclusion. The SEC defines "ordinary business operations" restrictively to exclude actions that by their nature have significant policy
or economic implications.' Such an interpretation would have
had the dual effect of promoting the micromanagement of publicly held corporations by their shareholders and expanding the
number and type of shareholder proposals that fall within the
regulatory authority of the SEC.
In rejecting the SEC approach, Justice Ginsburg expressed
an appreciation of Du Pont management's role in making the
day-to-day business and technical decisions necessary to implement a phase-out.' Her opinion is a cautious one that attempts to strike a balance between allowing shareholders to
place matters of great concern on the ballot at annual meetings
and preventing excessive interference by shareholders in the
corporation's day-to-day operations. The ruling preserves management's ability to exclude shareholder proposals that attempt
to enable shareholders to micromanage the company's implementation of policy.
Justice Ginsburg also has been suspicious of expansive interpretations of regulatory restrictions in the antitrust area. Thus,
in FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 5 she reviewed a challenge to a
corporate merger leveled under Section 13(b) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.'6 Section 13(b) provides that a preliminary injunction "may be granted" by a district court if the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is able to show a likelihood of

' The position of the SEC as amicus curiae differed from the position of its
staff, which had earlier issued two no-action letters stating that it would not
recommend enforcement action against Du Pont if the latter excluded the
proposal under Rule 14a-8. See id. at 426-427.
'3 Id. at 426.
14Id. at 427-28.
'5 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988).
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ultimate success in an action that alleges that the conduct at
issue violates the antitrust laws.'7
In Weyerhaeuser, the FTC brought a Section 13(b) action
alleging that the planned merger of two corrugated-container
manufacturers on the West Coast would increase concentration
in the relevant market and thereby decrease competition.18
The district court found that the FTC had met its burden of
demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits but declined
to issue an injunction enjoining the challenged merger. Instead,
the district court imposed a "hold separate order," allowing the
merger to go forward under certain specified conditions." Specifically, the hold separate order allowed one manufacturer to
acquire the other's assets but required that one of the acquired
company's production mills be preserved as a separate entity.
The district court determined that, should the FTC succeed at
full trial on the merits, the forced divestiture of this particular
mill would be an adequate remedy. 0
On appeal before the D.C. Circuit, the FTC argued that, once
the district court had concluded that the FTC was likely to
succeed in showing the merger's anti-competitive effect at trial,
the district court was precluded from allowing the merger to
proceed.2 ' Justice Ginsburg, however, affirmed the district
court's order. She rejected the FTC's argument that hold separate orders are not authorized by Section 13(b), finding nothing
in the statute's language or legislative history to prohibit such
an order.' Rather, Justice Ginsburg held that a district court
possesses an equitable power to issue a hold separate order in
a Section 13(b) proceeding when such an order is merited by
the particular facts of the case and the hold separate order can
realistically be expected to safeguard adequate relief.'
Justice Ginsburg's ruling preserves a defense in a Section
13(b) proceeding for the parties to a challenged merger. Even

17

Id.

's665 F.2d at 1074.
19Id. at 1075.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 1083.
22

Id.

at 1084.

SId. at 1085. But cf FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1346
(4th Cir. 1976) (private equities are not to be considered in granting or withholding injunctive relief under Section 13(b)).
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where the FTC can show a likelihood of success on the merits,
the parties can now avoid an injunction against the merger by
arguing that the equities support allowing the merger to proceed subject to a hold separate order. In essence, she would
allow a merger that may substantially lessen competition in the
industry to proceed - despite Section 13(b) - subject only to
the possibility that the district court would later order the
merged entity to divest itself of some portion of its business.
The FTC interpretation, by contrast, would have prohibited the
merger's consummation in the first place. Justice Ginsburg's
interpretation of Section 13(b) is less expansive than the interpretation urged by the FTC and, therefore, allows corporations
a greater degree of flexibility in pursuing mergers and acquisitions.
That Justice Ginsburg utilizes an interpretive approach that
keeps regulations from being applied expansively is further
suggested by U.S. v. Baker Hughes Inc.' Although Justice
Ginsburg did not write the opinion for the three judge panel of
the D.C. Circuit that heard the case, she joined Justice (thenJudge) Clarence Thomas' opinion harshly criticizing the Justice Department's proposed legal standard for establishing that
a merger or proposed merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.26 As described below, the standard adopted by Justice
Thomas makes it significantly more difficult for the Justice
Department to obtain a permanent injunction halting a corporate merger.
In Baker Hughes, a Finnish manufacturer of hardrock
hydraulic underground drilling rigs ("HHUDRs") proposed to
acquire the French subsidiary of an American company. The
subsidiary also manufactured HHUDRs. The Justice Department sought a permanent injunction to prevent the merger on
the ground that it would substantially lessen competition in,
the
United States HHUDR market in violation of Section 7.'

908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
' Justice Thomas wrote: "We find no merit in the legal standard propounded by the government. It is devoid of support in the statute, in the case law,
and in the government's own Merger Guidelines." 908 F.2d at 983.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
908 F.2d at 982.
24

2

Id.
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At a bench trial, the Justice Department introduced marketshare statistics sufficient to establish a presumption that the
merger would lead to undue concentration in both the relevant
product market (defined as three types of IH-UDRs and their
associated spare parts and components) and the relevant geographic market (defined as the geographic United States). 9
The burden of rebutting this presumption then shifted to the
defendant corporations. The district judge found that the defendants had successfully rebutted the presumption that competition may be substantially lessened by showing three things: (1)
there was an absence of significant barriers to entry into the
relevant market; (2) the statistics underlying the government's
prima facie case were misleading; and (3) IIH)DR consumers
were relatively sophisticated3 0 The district judge, therefore,
denied the government's request for a permanent injunction.31
On appeal, the Justice Department argued that, once a presumption is established that competition may be substantially
lessened, the defendant in a Section 7 proceeding can rebut
that presumption only by introducing evidence of an absence of
significant barriers to entry into the market and that the entry
by competitors would be "quick and effective."32 In addition,
the Justice Department argued that a defendant can rebut the
government's prima facie case only if the defendant's evidence
is sufficient to constitute a clear showing that after the merger
a competitor could make a quick and effective entry into the
market.3 Justice Thomas dismissed these contentions.
First, Justice Thomas held that nothing in either Section 7
or prior caselaw restricts a defendant to one type of evidence in
rebutting a prima facie case;' instead, no one type of evidence
is dispositive, and a variety of factors, constituting the totality
of the circumstances, are relevant in determining whether the
defendant's evidence successfully rebuts the presumption that
competition may be substantially lessened. 5 Second, Justice
Thomas held that where the defendant does introduce evidence

Id. at 983.
at 984.
3' Id. at 982.
2 Id. at 983.
33
29

3 Id.

id.

3
35

Id. at 984-86.
Id. at 985.
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that entry into the relevant market is relatively easy, that
evidence will rebut the presumption if it shows that future
entry into the market by a competitor is likely.36 According to
Justice Thomas, there was nothing in prior judicial interpretations of Section 7 that required the defendant to establish that
the future entry would be "quick and effective" and not just
likely. Finally, Justice Thomas reviewed relevant Supreme
Court decisions and concluded that, despite the onerous evidentiary burdeng that the Court had imposed on defendants in the
early Section 7 cases, the Court's more recent practice had been
to require the defendant show only that the government's prima
facie case did not accurately predict the merger's effect on future competition. 7 This is a significantly easier burden for the
defendant to meet than the Justice Department's proposed
alternative (which required the defendant to affirmatively show
that the merger will not substantially lessen competition in the
relevant market).
Justice Thomas' opinion enhances an antitrust defendant's
ability to rebut statistical evidence that a proposed merger may
reduce competition. Prior to the Baker Hughes decision, it was
at least arguable that the government could obtain an injunction halting a merger where the government's sole type of evidence was a statistical analysis suggesting that the mergedentity would possess a greater market share than was possessed in sum by the two individual companies prior to the
merger.3 8 Since Baker Hughes was decided, such evidence will
rarely suffice without more;" defendants may now overcome a
prima facie case built on market share statistics in a variety of
ways, from merely poking holes in the statistics themselves to

'8 Id. at 987-89.
7Id. at 99-91 (citing U.S. v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974)).

"See id. at 989-91 (citing U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966)
and U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)). Cf U.S. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F.Supp. 1061, 1074 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ('The failure of
Congress to require that the Government show irreparable loss on an application for a preliminary injunction in a Section 7 action ... indicates the Congressional desire to lighten the burden generally imposed on an applicant for

preliminary injunctive relief."), affd mem. sub. nom., Bartlett v. U.S., 401 U.S.
986 (1971).
"See U.S. v. United Tote Inc., 768 F.Supp. 1064, 1069-70 (D.Del. 1991)
(statistical analysis is merely first step in inquiry).
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producing evidence that new competitors may enter the relevant market.
By requiring the government to produce more decisive evidence than market share statistics in order to prevail, the Baker Hughes decision effectively prevents the government from
using these statistics as its sole criterion in making Section 7
enforcement decisions.' Under the Baker Hughes court's interpretation, Section 7's prohibition of anti-competitive mergers
does not block a merger simply because the merger results in a
company that has significantly increased market share. Like
the Roosevelt and Weyerhaeuser opinions authored by Justice
Ginsburg, the Baker Hughes opinion, in which she joined, rejects proffered statutory interpretations that would result in the
expansive
application of regulatory restrictions to corporate
41
activity.

B.

Showing Respect Toward Activity That is Designed to
Increase Economic Efficiency

Jurists who adhere to the "Chicago School" of law and economics use economic efficiency, often defined in terms of wealth
maximization, as the principal criterion for judging the desirability of legal rules.42 In this view, legal rules that promote
economic efficiency are preferable to rules that do not have

'" Justice Thomas wrote: "The government does not maximize its scarce
resources when it allows statistics alone to trigger its ponderous enforcement
machinery." 908 F.2d at 992 n.13.
41 See also Fedway Associates, Inc. v. United States Treasury, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1420-24 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Ginsburg, J.) (declining to adopt Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms'
interpretation of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that would have prohibited certain wholesale sales promotions).
42 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (1992); George
Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and
Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287-88 (1981). See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIvE APPROACH THEORY AND PRAcIICE 60-66 (1990)
(describing the relatively conservative approach taken by Chicago School adherents as opposed to other law and economics theorists); Harry First et al., Anti.
trust and a Dynamic Economy, in REVITALIZING ANiTRUST IN ris SECOND
CENTURY 91-93 (Harry First et al. eds. 1991) (placing the Chicago School in
context with other economic approaches to antitrust law). See also RICHARD A.
POsNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 459-460 (1990) (hereinafter Juris.
prudence).
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such a result.' Although Justice Ginsburg has not declared
allegiance to a legal method that relies principally on economic
analysis, she has written or joined opinions that exhibit respect
toward conduct that is designed to increase efficiency.
For example, in One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso,"

Justice Ginsburg held that an integration clause in a stock
option contract barred securities fraud claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45 The securities
fraud claims at issue were based on the defendants' allegedly
fraudulent representations and omissions during negotiations.
These representations were alleged to be material because they
concerned contemplated future conduct on the defendants' part
that would help determine the option contract's value." The
integration clause at issue provided that the contract "supersede[d] any and all previous understandings and agreements"
among the parties.4 7 In denying the plaintiffs' securities fraud
claims, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the integration clause
made "any reliance by plaintiffs on prior representations ...
unreasonable and any failure by defendants to disclose [their
contemplated future conduct] immaterial.' She also commented that, if the plaintiffs were allowed to recover under such
circumstances, "contracts would not be worth the paper on
which they were written."4 9 Her opinion, therefore, does not
allow one party to resort to non-contractual remedies for misrepresentation, such as those contained in the rules promulgated under Section 10(b), when the parties' written agreement
disavows the misrepresentation.
Although Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly invoke economic
efficiency in Caruso, her reasoning is consistent with a view

3 RicHARD POSNER, EcoNomic ANALYsiS OF LAW 23 (1992). In his most
recent writings, Richard Posner, perhaps the best known advocate of the law
and economics approach, appears to have moderated his prior assertion that the
economically efficient rule is necessarily the correct rule. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 27, 37-38 (1993) (characterizing Posner's position in Jurisprudence, supra note 43, as a shift away from
efficiency as an absolute norm and towards pragmatism in legal reasoning).
4 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Id. at 1286-87.
4 Id. at 1286.
47 Id.

4 Id.

4
1 Id.

(quoting Tonn v. Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. 1968)).
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that enforcing contracts according to their terms is, at least
generally, a more efficient means of policing commercial dealings than is allowing a party resort to the federal securities
laws. The legal rule adopted by Justice Ginsburg, giving the
written agreement priority over duties imposed on the seller by
Section 10(b), is efficient because it allows individuals to make
decisions in accordance with their perception of their own selfinterest. Many law and economics theorists would applaud the
result in Caruso on the theory that the legal system functions
more efficiently when it enforces such freely-made decisions
than it does when it ignores them and attempts to reconstruct
a more "equitable" bargain between the parties.50
Similarly, in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc.,5 Justice Ginsburg joined in an opinion by Judge Robert
Bork holding that a van line's refusal to deal with certain local
agents was not a violation of the antitrust laws. Judge Bork's
opinion reasoned that the refusal to deal was intended to enhance the van line's efficiency." The resulting efficiency, combined with the negligible anti-competitive effects of the refusal,
led Judge Bork to conclude that the refusal survived a "Rule of

o A comparison may be illustrative of Justice Ginsburg's approach. In
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), Judge
J. Skelly Wright wrote a landmark decision allowing a party to a furniture
rental contract to disavow the contract on the grounds that the bargain entered
into was unconscionable. Judge Wrights opinion can be criticized from a law
and economics perspective for focusing primarily on the status of the parties
and their perceived inability to bargain equally, rather than focusing on whether the contract was entered into freely in a competitive market for rental
furniture. See ROBIN MALLOY, supra note 43, at 107-11. In contrast to Judge
Wrights approach, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in One-O-One Enterprises avoids
an examination of the parties' status. Rather, she assumes that the purchaser
of the security made an informed choice in a competitive market for securities,
and holds the purchaser to that choice.
"1792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied., 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
52 Id. at 221.
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Reason" analysiss and, therefore, did not violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.'
Central to Judge Bork's reasoning in Rothery is the assumption that the goal of the antitrust laws is to promote economic
efficiency to the possible exclusion of other values. Judge Bork
and other conservative antitrust theorists of the Chicago School
have postulated that allowing companies to behave efficiently
will eventually lead to greater consumer welfare, and that this
furthers Congress' purposes in passing the Sherman Act.55
Judge Patricia Wald, in a concurrence, questioned Judge Bork's
assumption that the only goal of the antitrust laws is to increase economic efficiency and pointed out other objectives Congress may have had in mind. In particular, Judge Wald cited
commentators who have theorized that Congress sought to
serve not efficiency but political or social goals such as avoiding
excessive concentrations of economic (and concomitant political)

a' The literal language of Section 1, declaring every conspiracy in restraint
of trade to be illegal, would crhninalize every agreement concerning trade. See
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Recognizing this
fact, the Supreme Court has long held that the statute only prohibits "unreasonable" restraints of trade. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911). A "Rule of Reason" analysis has
developed to allow the court to determine which practices impose an unreasonable restraint on competition. The classic articulation of the Rule of Reason was
set forth by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, all are relevant facts.
246 U.S. at 238 (Brandeis, J.).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
55 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUsT PARADOX 84 (1978); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). See generally
First et al., supra note 43, at 91-92. For a critique of the Chicago School's
definition of "consumer welfare" from a less conservative law and economics
perspective, see Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN
rTs SECOND CENTURY 95-129 (Harry First, et al. eds. 1991).
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power in the hands of a few corporations, thereby enhancing
the economic and political freedom of individuals."
By joining in Judge Bork's opinion rather than Judge Wald's
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg may be understood to have chosen Judge Bork's side of the debate." In her confirmation
hearings, however, Justice Ginsburg attempted to distance herself from the Rothery opinion, stating that she disagreed with
some of Judge Bork's reasoning but agreed with the result.58
Nevertheless, one must wonder why Justice Ginsburg did not
then join Judge Wald's concurrence or write separately herself.
Justice Ginsburg pointed during her confirmation hearings to
her dissenting opinion in Michigan Citizens For An Independent
' 92 F.2d at 231 n.2 (Wald, J., concurring) (citing, among others, Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTiNGS L.J. 65, 68 (1983)). See also
Patricia Wald, The "New"Administrative Law - With the Same Old Judges In
It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 662 n.73 (1991) (citing commentators who argue that
the antitrust laws enforce a distributive view of economics rather than a view
premised on efficiency).
' See also Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 786 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d
953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968), for the proposition that the paramount aspect of
antitrust policy is the promotion of "the most efficient allocation of resources
possible").
Justice Ginsburg also joined in Judge Bork's opinion in Neumann v. The
Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied., 479 U.S. 851
(1986), which addressed a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. While this
opinion, unlike Rothery, does not explicitly rely on economic efficiency grounds
in rejecting the plaintiffs claim, it does appear to share the Rothery opinion's
assumption that the goal of the antitrust laws is to promote intra-corporate
efficiency in order to benefit consumers. See id. at 427 (stating that Section 2
prohibits predation, not the exercise of monopoly power acquired through superior efficiency).
Indeed, Justice Thomas' opinion in U.S. v. Baker Hughes Inc., see supra
notes 25-42 and accompanying text, an opinion which Justice Ginsburg also
joined, relies on a similar view that the antitrust laws are designed to protect
the consumer from monopolistic prices rather than to ensure the existence of a
certain minimum number of competitors in the market. Justice Thomas quoted
Judge Posner. "[Tihe economic concept-of competition, rather than any desire to
preserve rivals as such, is the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the antitrust laws. .

. ."

908 F.2d at 990 n.12 (quoting Hospital Corp.

of America. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
(1987)).
' Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 20, 1993)
(response of Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Howard Metzenbaum)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
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Press v. Thornburgh9 as an example of her antitrust philosophy." In Michigan Citizens For An Independent Press, the
D.C. Circuit was called upon to decide whether the Attorney
General was authorized under the antitrust laws to permit two
Detroit newspapers to operate jointly.6 ' The majority allowed
the merger, but Justice Ginsburg dissented. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Michigan Citizens, however, actually turned on the
interpretive question of whether a specific statutory exception 2 to the antitrust laws should be read narrowly, not on
questions of economic efficiency's role in applying the Sherman
Act." The majority read The Newspaper Preservation Act
broadly and, therefore, allowed the merger." Justice Ginsburg
did not believe that the Act authorized the specific actions
taken by the Attorney General.' In reality, therefore, Justice
in this case sheds little light on her antiGinsburg's dissent
66
trust philosophy.
When given another opportuhity during the hearings to elaborate on her views about the role of economic efficiency in ap-

9 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), afrd by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38
(1989).
o Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 20, 1993)
(response of Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Howard Metzenbaum)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
61 Id. at 1286.
The Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
' 868 F.2d at 1299.
6Id. at 1291-1293.
' Given Justice Ginsburg's observed tendency to interpret statutes so as to
avoid their expansive application to corporate activity, one might question why
she did not adopt the majority's opinion in Michigan Citizens For An Independent Press. One possible response is that the court was called upon to interpret
an exception to the general scope of merger activity permitted under the antitrust laws. Exceptions to the antitrust laws traditionally have been construed
narrowly. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205 (1979). A second possibility is that the loss of an independent voice following the joint operating agreement between Detroits only two daily newspapers
raised First Amendment concerns for Justice Ginsburg that outweighed the
more narrow antitrust issue at stake.
"During the hearings, Justice Ginsburg characterized the debate over
Rothery as a disagreement over one footnote in the opinion and stated that
there is nothing in the judgment itself with which anyone could quarrel. Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 22, 1993) (response of
Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Howard Metzenbaum) available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
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plying the antitrust laws, Justice Ginsburg sidestepped the
question. She was asked what weight, if any, she would give
economic efficiency arguments that are advanced to justify anticompetitive conduct." Her response was equivocal, stating
that the antitrust laws are "focused on the interests of the
consumer," but that they also recognize an interest in "preserving the independence of entrepreneurs."'
Those who advocate economic efficiency as the primary or
exclusive goal of the antitrust laws argue that such a view best
serves the interests of the consumer.6" Judge Bork and others
have used the term "consumer welfare" to refer to the increased
aggregate wealth (consumer and producer surplus) that they
argue results from allowing efficient business behavior.1 0 It is
possible, therefore, to interpret Justice Ginsburg's reference to
consumer interests as an endorsement of Judge Bork's economic
efficiency views in Rothery. Such a reading would be in apparent conflict with the view that the antitrust laws are primarily
designed to protect new entrants in the market, such as entrepreneurs.
Justice Ginsburg did state in her response, however, that the
antitrust laws recognize the interests of entrepreneurs who
wish to enter the market and compete with established companies. But promoting entrepreneurial activity as a value in itself
may often conflict with promoting economic efficiency. Justice
Ginsburg may not have appreciated the potential for conflict
between these values in many cases, or she may simply have
wished to evade the question. Admittedly, Justice Ginsburg did
not indicate that she used the term "consumer welfare" in the
same sense that it is used by conservative antitrust theorists.
Although this seems unlikely, perhaps she is simply not familiar with the term's connotations - a possibility raised by her

' Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 22, 1993)
(response of Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Howard Metzenbaum)
available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
M
Id.

' See BORIE, supra note 57, at 84; see also Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 18 (Harry First

et al., eds. 1991).
o See id.; See also First, supra note 43, at 91.
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disarming admission during the confirmation hearings that
"antitrust... is not my strong suit."7'
Although Justice Ginsburg's views about the proper weight
economic efficiency arguments should be accorded in antitrust
cases are not clear, it is possible to draw some more general
conclusions concerning her receptivity to efficiency arguments.
Thus, Justice Ginsburg has not indicated that she believes
economic analysis provides a unifying theory of law that should
be applied to promote efficiency in a myriad of factual situations. Yet, as the analysis above indicates, her voting patterns
are consistent with a view that, at least in business contexts,
economic efficiency is an important value.72
C.

Deferring to Decisions of Administrative Agencies
Acting Within Their Sphere of Authority

As a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Justice Ginsburg was often called upon to review the administrative decisions of independent and executive branch
federal agencies.73 In this context, she typically deferred to the
agency's decision, provided that Congress had delegated authority to make the decision at issue to the agency, and that the
agency's decision was the result of a full and reasoned consideration of the facts. 4 Justice Ginsburg usually did not defer to
7' Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 22, 1993)
(reisponse of Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Howard Metzenbaum)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
I See also Fedway Associates, Inc. v. United States Treasury, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg,
J.) (Federal Alcohol Administration Act should not be interpreted to allow the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to inhibit the "free and rational
economic choice" of retailers).
" The issue of judicial review of agency decisions differs from the question
of whether a court should defer to the agency's asserted interpretation of law.
In the former case, the court is acting as a reviewing court of the administrative body. See Chevron U.S., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(describing limited role of federal court review in such cases). In the latter case,
there is often no administrative "decision" to review and an appellate court
instead is called upon to review the legal findings of a federal district court. See
Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 427 n.19. When there is no administrative decision to
review, Justice Ginsburg has often declined to adopt an agency's asserted
interpretation of law when the result is to expand regulatory restrictions on
corporate conduct. See supra notes 7-42 and accompanying text.
7' See, e.g., Household Goods Forwarders Tariff Bureau v. ICC, 968 F.2d 81
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agency decisions, however, where she found those decisions to
be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the agency's prior decisions. For example, in Sang Seup Shin v. INS,75 Justice
Ginsburg chose not to defer to a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), even though the decision was discretionary in nature, because the decision ignored factors to which
the BIA had given great weight in prior cases.76
Applying these principles, Justice Ginsburg has upheld regulatory decisions even when they have produced controversial
results. In Consumer Federationof America v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,7 for example, she deferred to a Consumer Product Safety Commission decision to terminate
rulemaking that would have imposed safety restrictions on the
sale of all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs"). 75 Similarly, in Wint v.
Yeutter,79 her opinion deferred to a Department of Agriculture
rule that effectively eliminated thousands of sugar cane workers
from eligibility for legalization under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act.80
Her treatment of the agency review issue reveals an appreciation of the manner in which the federal government's authority is allocated among various entities, and a desire to avoid
encroachment by the judiciary on the agencies' "turf." She appears to have resisted the temptation to overturn an agency
determination simply because she disagreed with the result of
the agency's actions.
In her confirmation hearings, Justice Ginsburg revealed that
her deferential treatment of agency determinations has been
influenced by the Supreme Court's reversal of her circuit court
opinion in Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. NRDC.5 ' In that case, the
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding ICC action where the agency acted pursuant to
statutory authority and adequately articulated its reasoning).
75750 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76 Id. at 127.
7 990 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
76 Id. at 1306 (finding that the Commission's decision to monitor industry
compliance by using an outstanding consent decree rather than by imposing a
ban on sales of ATVs to minors was a rational one).
79 902 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
so Id. at 82-84 (holding that the Department of Agriculture's decision to
define "fruits and vegetables of every kind and other perishable commodities" to
exclude sugar cane is a rational decision that is consistent with congressional
intent).
81 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reversed, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Hearings on
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Supreme Court held that where Congress' intent in passing a
statute or one of its provisions is not clear, a federal court
should defer to the actions taken by the agency charged with
enforcing the given statute so long as those actions were taken
pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 2
Justice Ginsburg stressed during the hearings, however, that
"deference does not mean abdication" of a judge's duty to review the actions of the federal bureaucracy." In the past, Justice Ginsburg has not deferred to agency determinations where
doing so threatened certain fundamental principles. For example, she has not deferred to agency action where the result
would be to deny a party access to the federal courts. Thus, in
Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v.
FDIC," she rejected the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's ("FDIC") interpretation of the word "creditor" under
FIRREAt m where the result of the agency's interpretation was
to deny unions access to federal court.8" By contrast, in
Randall v. Meese,"7 Justice Ginsburg deferred to a discretionary decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
partly because federal court review of the challenged decision
would remain available to the plaintiff at a future time."m

the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 22, 1993) (response of Judge
Legis
Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Arlan Specter) available in LIS,
Library, Fednew file.
467 U.S. at 842-43.
' Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 5 (July 21, 1993)
(response of Judge Ginsburg to questioning by Senator Carol Mosley-Braun)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew file.
962 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
"The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1821 (1989).
' 962 F.2d at 67. It was also significant to Justice Ginsburg that FIRREA
provided for de novo review of the FDIC determination in federal court. Id. at
65. Thus, she stated that under these circumstances the Chevron principle of
deference to agency decisionmaking did not apply. Id.
In the past, Justice Ginsburg has often striven to ensure that a federal court
remains available to aggrieved parties. See Beckett v. Airline Pilots Assoc., 995
F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In Beckett, Justice Ginsburg joined an opinion by
Judge Edwards that took pains to construct a theory of plaintiffs' case that
provided a federal forum for the plaintiffs. See id. (holding that former Pan Am
pilots had standing to file a suit in federal court seeking to enforce a consent
decree between their union and Pan Am).
87 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied., 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
88Id. at 481-82.
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Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has not deferred to an agency's
decision when she believed that it would threaten constitutional
principles such as freedom of speech or due process. For example, in Abourezk v. Reagan,89 she refused to defer to a State
Department interpretation of an exclusion provisiono under
the Immigration and Nationality Act that would have jeopardized free speech values.9 1 The State Department had interpreted the statute in a manner that resulted in the denial of
visas to members of communist organizations who had been
invited to speak in the United States.92 Judge Bork, in dissent, argued that Chevron principles required the court to defer
to the State Department's interpretation.9 3 Justice Ginsburg,
by contrast, concurred in the majority opinion that remanded
the case to the district court for reconsideration of whether the
State Department's construction of the Act's exclusion provisions was inconsistent with its prior administrative practice."
III.

CONCLUSION

Justice Ginsburg's prior judicial record suggests that she will
be a moderate to conservative jurist on matters of business and
regulatory law. She has shown a preference for narrow applications of government regulations to business interests and a
healthy respect for the reasoned determinations of regulatory
agencies. Unlike members of the "Chicago School," Justice
Ginsburg does not appear to adhere to the philosophy that
economic efficiency should be pursued to the exclusion of other
values. However, her voting patterns are consistent with a
philosophy that it is important to promote efficiency in business-law cases. Moderating her decisions on business and regulatory matters is her sensitivity to government action that may
infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens.
8 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484
U.S. 1 (1987).
' Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
91 785 F.2d at 1054-56.
92

Id. at 1048-49.

' 785 F.2d at 1066.
' Id. at 1056. See also Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 525-26 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (remanding for a determination of whether a
permanent resident alien's due process rights were violated by the summary
exclusion proceedings used to deny re-entry after a trip abroad).
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Only time will tell to what extent Justice Ginsburg's voting
patterns in business law cases have been influenced by a desire
to avoid writing separate opinions because they might lead to
confusion in the law - a desire that she has articulated on
previous occasions." A preference for certainty and predictability in the law, thus, may have led her to overlook relatively
minor differences with her more conservative colleagues in the
past.9" Now that Justice Ginsburg has joined the Supreme
Court, her future opinions may exhibit a greater willingness to
adopt a moderate approach, even where the result is a separate
concurrence. Ironically, if Justice Ginsburg chooses to write
separately from a conservative majority in order to embrace a
middle ground, one consequence may be more fractured opinions from the Supreme Court97 and less guidance on business
law issues.

" Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV.
133, 134, 148-150 (1990). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1992) (noting the advantage of clarity in
the law when an appellate court speaks with unanimity). But see id. at 1194
(emphasizing that dissents and separate concurrences "are not consummations
devoutly to be avoided").
' This preference for certainty in the law does not explain why she joined
Judge Bork's majority opinion in Rothery rather than Judge Wald's concurrence.
See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct.
2711 (1993) (three separate opinions and one dissent issued, without any one
clear rule of decision, in connection with contention that punitive damages
award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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